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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of empirical evidence about the impact of financial
globalization on growth and volatility in developing countries. The results suggest that it is difficult
to  establish  a  robust  causal  relationship  between  financial  integration  and  economic  growth.
Furthermore, there is little evidence that developing countries have been consistently successful in
using financial integration to stabilize fluctuations in consumption growth. However, we do find that
financial globalization can be beneficial under the right circumstances. Empirically, good institutions
and  quality  of  governance  are  crucial  in  helping  developing  countries  derive  the  benefits  of
globalization.  Similarly,  macroeconomic  stability  appears  to  be  an  important  prerequisite  for
ensuring that financial globalization is beneficial for developing countries. Finally, countries that
employ relatively flexible exchange rate regimes and succeed in maintaining fiscal discipline are




























I.   INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The recent wave of financial globalization since the mid-1980s has been marked by a 
surge in capital flows among industrial countries and, more notably, between industrial and 
developing countries. While these capital flows have been associated with high growth rates in 
some developing countries, a number of countries have experienced episodic collapses in growth 
rates and significant financial crises over the same period, crises that have exacted a serious toll 
in terms of macroeconomic and social costs. As a result, an intense debate has emerged in both 
academic and policy circles about the effects of financial integration on developing economies. 
But much of the debate has been based on only casual and limited empirical evidence. 
The objective of this paper is to provide an assessment of empirical evidence on the 
effects of financial globalization for developing economies. The paper will focus on a couple of 
related questions: (i) does financial globalization promote economic growth in developing 
countries? (ii) what is its impact on macroeconomic volatility in these countries?  
 
While this paper does not deal directly with poverty issues, its main subject - the effects 
of financial globalization on economic growth and volatility - has important indirect effects. 
First, economic growth has been the most reliable source of poverty reduction. Second, holding 
level of income constant, an increase in volatility reduces the well-being of most households, 
especially those of the poor as they are least able to protect themselves. 
The principal conclusions that emerge from the analysis are sobering, but in many ways 
informative from a policy perspective. It is true that many developing economies with a high 
degree of financial integration have also experienced higher growth rates. It is also true that, in 
theory, there are many channels by which financial openness could enhance growth. However, a 
systematic examination of the evidence suggests that it is difficult to establish a robust causal 
relationship between the degree of financial integration and output growth performance. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of macroeconomic stability, consumption is regarded as a 
better measure of well-being than output; fluctuations in consumption are therefore regarded as 
having a negative impact on economic welfare. There is little evidence that financial integration 
has helped developing countries to better stabilize fluctuations in consumption growth, 
notwithstanding the theoretically large benefits that could accrue to developing countries in this 
respect. In fact, new evidence presented in this paper suggests that low to moderate levels of 
financial integration may have made some countries subject to even greater volatility of 
consumption relative to that of output. Thus, while there is no proof in the data that financial 
globalization has benefited growth, there is evidence that some developing countries may have 
experienced greater consumption volatility as a result. 
One must be careful, however, not to draw the inference from these results that financial 
globalization is inherently too risky, and that developing countries should retreat into stronger 
forms of capital controls. First, as we analyze in an earlier extended version of this paper 
(Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003), empirical evidence supports the view that countries are 
considerably more likely to benefit from financial globalization when they take simultaneous    
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steps-- sometimes even modest ones--to improve governance, transparency and financial sector 
regulation. Second, it is almost surely the case that excessive reliance on fixed exchange rate 
regimes has been a major contributory factor to financial crises in emerging market countries 
over the past fifteen years. Moving to more flexible exchange rate regimes is therefore likely to 
considerably alleviate some of the risks countries must endure as they become more financially 
globalized (for countries that are not financially globalized, fixed exchange rate regimes may be 
a perfectly good choice, as the empirical results in Rogoff et. al. 2004, suggest). Third, countries 
that consistently face problems associated with government debt (referred to as “serial 
defaulters” by Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004b), are more likely to benefit from financial 
globalization if their governments simultaneously take measures to avoid an excessive buildup of 
debt. 
  It is also important to note that much of the analysis in this paper focuses on de facto 
rather than de jure financial globalization. This makes sense in an empirical paper since capital 
controls come in so many flavors, and enforcement varies so widely across countries, that cross-
country empirical comparisons based on measures of de jure capital controls are extremely 
difficult to interpret. By contrast, de facto financial integration is not a variable that a country’s 
government can easily regulate. Although many countries have tight capital controls on paper, 
their degree of de facto financial globalization is nevertheless high because these controls can be 
easily evaded in practice. This problem is almost surely exacerbated by the kind of domestic 
financial liberalizations that many countries have chosen to undergo over the past two decades in 
an effort to channel savings more efficiently and thereby spur growth. At the same time, some 
poor countries have few impediments to capital flows, but their level of de facto financial 
globalization is still very low, even when measured relative to national income. 
  This paper does not look directly at how financial globalization affects absolute or 
relative measures of poverty. The effects could easily go in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
sustained high growth is the most consistently successful policy for alleviating absolute poverty, 
as China and India have succeeded in doing over the past two decades.  On the other hand, 
periods of high growth are often associated with higher income inequality and, therefore, relative 
measures of poverty may easily rise. Increased macroeconomic volatility, however, probably 
increases both absolute and relative measures of poverty, particularly in the case of financial 
crises that lead to sharp rises in unemployment. The evidence presented in this paper suggests 
that a detailed study of the link between financial globalization and poverty is likely to yield 
ambiguous results for emerging market countries, albeit with the same caveats: Countries that 
work simultaneously to improve institutions, and ones that avoid overly fixed exchange rate 
regimes, have a much better chance of seeing financial globalization lead to poverty reduction, at 
least by absolute measures. 
The remainder of this section provides an overview of the structure of the paper. In brief, 
Section II begins with a documentation of some salient features of global financial integration 
from the perspective of developing countries. Sections III and IV analyze the evidence on the 
effects of financial globalization on growth and volatility, respectively, in developing countries. 
Section V concludes.     
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A.   Definitions and Basic Stylized Facts 
Financial globalization and financial integration are, in principle different concepts. 
Financial globalization is an aggregate concept that refers to rising global linkages through cross-
border financial flows. Financial integration refers to an individual country’s linkages to 
international capital markets. Clearly, these concepts are closely related. For instance, increasing 
financial globalization is perforce associated with rising financial integration on average. In this 
paper, the two terms are used interchangeably. 
Of more relevance for the purposes of this paper is the distinction between de jure 
financial integration, which is associated with policies on capital account liberalization, and 
actual capital flows. For example, indicator measures of the extent of government restrictions on 
capital flows across national borders have been used extensively in the literature. By this 
measure, many countries in Latin America would be considered closed to financial flows. On the 
other hand, the volume of capital actually crossing the borders of these countries has been large 
relative to the average volume of flows across all developing countries. Therefore, on a de facto 
basis, these countries are quite open to global financial flows. By contrast, some countries in 
Africa have few formal restrictions on capital account transactions but have not experienced 
significant capital flows. The analysis in this paper will focus largely on de facto measures of 
financial integration, as it is virtually impossible to compare the efficacy of various complex 
restrictions across countries. In the end, what matters most is the actual degree of openness. 
However, the paper will also consider the relationship between de jure and de facto measures. 
As discussed in section II, a few salient features of global capital flows are relevant for 
the central themes of the paper. First, the volume of cross-border capital flows has risen 
substantially in the last decade. Not only has there been a much greater volume of flows among 
industrial countries but there has also been a surge in flows between industrial and developing 
countries. Second, this surge in international capital flows to developing countries is the outcome 
of both “pull” and “push” factors. “Pull factors” arise from changes in policies and other aspects 
of opening up by developing countries. These include liberalization of capital accounts and 
domestic stock markets, and large-scale privatization programs. “Push factors” include business 
cycle conditions and macroeconomic policy changes in industrial countries. From a longer-term 
perspective, this latter set of factors includes the rise in the importance of institutional investors 
in industrial countries and demographic changes (e.g., relative aging of the population in 
industrial countries). The importance of these factors suggests that, notwithstanding temporary 
interruptions in crisis periods or during global business cycle downturns, the past twenty years 
have been characterized by secular pressures for rising global capital flows to the developing 
world. 
Another important feature of international capital flows is that the components of these 
flows differ markedly in terms of volatility. In particular, bank borrowing and portfolio flows are 
substantially more volatile than foreign direct investment. In spite of a caveat that accurate 
classification of capital flows is not easy, evidence suggests that the composition of capital flows 
can have a significant influence on a country’s vulnerability to financial crises.    
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B.   Does Financial Globalization Promote Growth in Developing Countries? 
Section III will summarize the theoretical benefits of financial globalization for economic 
growth and then review the empirical evidence. Financial globalization could, in principle, help 
to raise the growth rate in developing countries through a number of channels. Some of these 
directly affect the determinants of economic growth (augmentation of domestic savings, 
reduction in the cost of capital, transfer of technology from advanced to developing countries, 
and development of domestic financial sectors). Indirect channels, which in some cases could be 
even more important than the direct ones, include increased production specialization due to 
better risk management, and improvements in both macroeconomic policies and institutions 
induced by the competitive pressures or the “discipline effect” of globalization. 
How much of the advertised benefits for economic growth have actually materialized in 
the developing world? As documented in this paper, the average income per capita for the group 
of more financially open (developing) economies does grow at a more favorable rate than that of 
the group of less financially open economies. However, whether this actually reflects a causal 
relationship and whether this correlation is robust to controlling for other factors remain 
unresolved questions. The literature on this subject, voluminous as it is, does not present a 
conclusive picture. A few papers find a positive effect of financial integration on growth. 
However, the majority find no effect or at best a mixed effect. Thus, an objective reading of the 
vast research effort to date suggests that there is no strong, robust and uniform support for the 
theoretical argument that financial globalization per se delivers a higher rate of economic 
growth.  
Perhaps this is not surprising. As noted by several authors, most of the cross-country 
differences in per capita incomes stem not from differences in the capital-labor ratio, but from 
differences in total factor productivity, which could be explained by “soft” factors like 
governance and rule of law. In this case, while embracing financial globalization may result in 
higher capital inflows, it is unlikely to cause faster growth by itself. In addition, some of the 
countries with capital account liberalization have experienced output collapses related to costly 
banking or currency crises. This is elaborated below. An alternative possibility, as noted earlier, 
is that financial globalization fosters better institutions and domestic policies but that these 
indirect channels can not be captured in standard regression frameworks. 
In short, while financial globalization can, in theory, help to promote economic growth 
through various channels, there is as yet no robust empirical evidence that this causal 
relationship is quantitatively very important. This points to an interesting contrast between 
financial openness and trade openness, since an overwhelming majority of research papers have 
found a positive effect of the latter on economic growth. 
C.   What Is the Impact of Financial Globalization on Macroeconomic Volatility? 
In theory, financial globalization can help developing countries to better manage output 
and consumption volatility. Indeed, a variety of theories implies that the volatility of 
consumption relative to that of output should go down as the degree of financial integration 
increases; the essence of global financial diversification is that a country is able to offload some    
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of its income risk in world markets. Since most developing countries are rather specialized in 
their output and factor endowment structures, they can, in theory, obtain even bigger gains than 
developed countries through international consumption risk sharing, that is, by effectively selling 
off a stake in their domestic output in return for a stake in global output. 
How much of the potential benefits in terms of better management of consumption 
volatility has actually been realized? This question is particularly relevant in terms of 
understanding whether, despite the output volatility experienced by developing countries that 
have undergone financial crises, financial integration has protected them from consumption 
volatility. New research presented in section IV paints a troubling picture. Specifically, while the 
volatility of output growth has, on average, declined in the 1990s relative to the three earlier 
decades, the volatility of consumption growth relative to that of income growth has on average 
increased for the emerging market economies in the 1990s, which was precisely the period of a 
rapid increase in financial globalization. In other words, as argued in more detail later in the 
paper, procyclical access to international capital markets appears to have had a perverse effect on 
the relative volatility of consumption for financially integrated developing economies. 
Interestingly, a more nuanced look at the data suggests the possible presence of a 
threshold effect. At low levels of financial integration, an increment in financial integration is 
associated with an increase in the relative volatility of consumption. However, once the level of 
financial integration crosses a threshold, the association becomes negative. In other words, for 
countries that are sufficiently open financially, relative consumption volatility starts to decline. 
This finding is potentially consistent with the view that international financial integration can 
help to promote domestic financial sector development, which in turn can help to moderate 
domestic macroeconomic volatility. However, thus far these benefits of financial integration 
appear to have accrued primarily to industrial countries. 
In this vein, the proliferation of financial and currency crises among developing 
economies is often viewed as a natural consequence of the “growing pains” associated with 
financial globalization. These can take various forms. First, international investors have a 
tendency to engage in momentum trading and herding, which can be destabilizing for developing 
economies. Second, international investors may (together with domestic residents) engage in 
speculative attacks on developing countries currencies, thereby causing instability that is not 
warranted based on the economic and policy fundamentals of these countries. Third, the risk of 
contagion presents a major threat to otherwise healthy countries since international investors 
could withdraw capital from these countries for reasons unrelated to domestic factors. Fourth, a 
government, even if democratically elected, may not give sufficient weight to the interest of 
future generations. This becomes a problem when the interests of future and current generations 
diverge, causing the government to incur excessive amounts of debt. Financial globalization, by 
making it easier for governments to incur debt, might aggravate this “over-borrowing” problem. 
These four hypotheses are not necessarily independent, and can reinforce each other. 
There is some empirical support for these hypothesized effects. For example, there is 
evidence that international investors do engage in herding and momentum trading in emerging 
markets, more so than in developed countries. Recent research also suggests the presence of    
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contagion in international financial markets. In addition, some developing countries that open 
their capital markets do appear to accumulate unsustainably high levels of external debt. 
To summarize, one of the theoretical benefits of financial globalization, other than to 
enhance growth, is to allow developing countries to better manage macroeconomic volatility, 
especially by reducing consumption volatility relative to output volatility. The evidence suggests 
that, instead, countries that are in the early stages of financial integration have been exposed to 
significant risks in terms of higher volatility of both output and consumption. 
D.   The Role of Institutions and Governance in the Effects of Globalization 
While it is difficult to find a simple relationship between financial globalization and 
growth or consumption volatility, there is some evidence of nonlinearities or threshold effects in 
the relationship. That is, financial globalization, in combination with good macroeconomic 
policies and good domestic governance, appears to be conducive to growth (see Prasad et. al., 
2003). For example, countries with good human capital and governance tend to do better at 
attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), which is especially conducive to growth. More 
specifically, recent research shows that corruption has a strongly negative effect on FDI inflows. 
Similarly, transparency of government operations, which is another dimension of good 
governance, has a strong positive effect on investment inflows from international mutual funds. 
The vulnerability of a developing country to the “risk factors” associated with financial 
globalization is also not independent from the quality of macroeconomic policies and domestic 
governance. For example, research has demonstrated that an overvalued exchange rate and an 
overextended domestic lending boom often precede a currency crisis. In addition, lack of 
transparency has been shown to be associated with more herding behavior by international 
investors that can destabilize a developing country’s financial markets. Finally, evidence shows 
that a high degree of corruption may affect the composition of a country’s capital inflows in a 
manner that makes it more vulnerable to the risks of speculative attacks and contagion effects. 
Thus, the ability of a developing country to derive benefits from financial globalization 
and its relative vulnerability to the volatility of international capital flows can be significantly 
affected by the quality of both its macroeconomic framework and institutions. 
E.   Summary 
The objective of the paper is not so much to derive new policy propositions as it is to 
inform the debate on the potential and actual benefit-risk tradeoffs associated with financial 
globalization by reviewing the available empirical evidence and country experiences. The main 
conclusions are that, so far, it has proven difficult to find robust evidence in support of the 
proposition that financial integration helps developing countries to improve growth and to reduce 
macroeconomic volatility. 
Of course, the absence of robust evidence on these dimensions does not necessarily mean 
that financial globalization has no benefits and carries only great risks. Indeed, most countries 
that have initiated financial integration have continued along this path, despite temporary    
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setbacks. This observation is consistent with the notion that the indirect benefits of financial 
integration, which may be difficult to pick up in regression analysis, could be quite important. 
Also, the long run gains, in some cases yet unrealized, may far offset the short term costs. For 
instance, the European Monetary Union experienced severe and costly crises in the early 1990s 
as part of the transition to a single currency throughout much of Europe today. 
While it is difficult to distill new and innovative policy messages from the review of the 
evidence, there appears to be empirical support for some general propositions. Empirically, good 
institutions and quality of governance are important not only in their own right, but in helping 
developing countries derive the benefits of globalization. Similarly, macroeconomic stability 
appears to be an important prerequisite for ensuring that financial integration is beneficial for 
developing countries. These points may already be generally accepted; the contribution of this 
paper is to show that there is some systematic empirical evidence to support them. In addition, 
the analysis suggests that financial globalization should be approached cautiously and with good 
institutions and macroeconomic frameworks viewed as preconditions. 
II.   BASIC STYLIZED FACTS 
De jure restrictions on capital flows and actual capital flows across national borders are 
two ways of measuring the extent of a country’s financial integration with the global economy. 
The differences between these two measures are important for understanding the effects of 
financial integration. By either measure, developing countries’ financial linkages with the global 
economy have risen in recent years.
1 However, a relatively small group of developing countries 
has garnered a lion’s share of private capital flows from industrial to developing countries, which 
surged in the 1990s. Structural factors, including demographic shifts in industrial countries, are 
likely to provide an impetus to these “North-South” flows over the medium and long term.  
A.   Measuring Financial Integration 
Capital account liberalization is typically considered an important precursor to financial 
integration. Most formal empirical work analyzing the effects of capital account liberalization 
has used a measure based on the official restrictions on capital flows as reported to the IMF by 
national authorities. However, this binary indicator directly measures capital controls but does 
not capture differences in the intensity of these controls.
2 A more direct measure of financial 
openness is based on the estimated gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities as a share of 
GDP. The stock data constitutes a better indication of integration, for our purposes, than the 
                                                 
1 Eichengreen and Bordo (2002), Obtfeld and Taylor (2002), and Mauro, Sussman, and Yafeh (2002) 
examine historical roots of international financial integration. 
2The restriction measure is available until 1995, when a new and more refined measure—not backward 
compatible—was introduced. The earlier data were extended through 1998 by Mody and Murshid (2002).    
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underlying flows since they are less volatile from year to year and are less prone to measurement 
error (assuming that such errors are not correlated over time).
3, 
4 
While these two measures of financial integration are related, they denote two distinct 
aspects. The capital account restrictions measure reflects the existence of de jure restrictions on 
capital flows while the financial openness measure captures de facto financial integration in 
terms of realized capital flows. This distinction is of considerable importance for the analysis in 
this paper and implies a 2x2 set of combinations of these two aspects of integration. Many 
industrial countries have attained a high degree of financial integration in terms of both 
measures. Some developing countries with capital account restrictions have found these 
restrictions ineffective in controlling actual capital flows. Episodes of capital flight from some 
Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s are examples of such involuntary de facto 
financial integration in economies that are de jure closed to financial flows (i.e., integration 
without capital account liberalization). On the other hand, some countries in Africa have few 
capital account restrictions but have experienced only minimal levels of capital flows (i.e., 
liberalization without integration).
5 And, of course, it is not difficult to find examples of 
countries with closed capital accounts that are also effectively closed in terms of capital flows. 
How has financial integration evolved over time for different groups of countries based 
on alternative measures?
6 By either measure, the difference in financial openness between 
industrial and developing countries is quite stark. Industrial economies have had an enormous 
increase in financial openness, particularly in the 1990s. While this measure also increased for 
developing economies in that decade, the level remains far below that of industrial economies. 
For industrial countries, unweighted cross-country averages of the two measures are 
mirror images and jointly confirm that these countries have undergone rapid financial integration 
                                                 
3These stock data were constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). Operationally, this measure 
involves calculating the gross levels of FDI and portfolio assets and liabilities via the accumulation of the 
corresponding inflows and outflows, and making relevant valuation adjustments. A similar measure using 
the same underlying stock data has been considered by Chanda (2000) and O’Donnell (2001). 
4Other measures of capital market integration include saving-investment correlations and various interest 
parity conditions (Frankel, 1992). These measures are difficult to operationalize for the extended time 
period and large number of countries in the data sample for this paper. 
5An analogy from the literature on international trade may be relevant here. Some countries, due to their 
remoteness from major world markets or other unfavorable geographical attributes, have low trade flows 
despite having minimal barriers to trade even after controlling for various other factors. Similarly, certain 
countries, due to their remoteness from major financial centers, in terms of either physical distance or 
historical relationships, may experience limited capital flows despite having relatively open capital 
accounts, (see Loungani, Mody, and Razin (2003)). 
6 The dataset used in this paper consists of 76 industrial and developing countries (except where otherwise 
indicated) and covers the period 1960–99. Given the long sample period, several countries currently 
defined as industrial (e.g., Korea and Singapore) are included in the developing country group. The 
following were excluded from the dataset: most of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (which mostly 
receive official flows), the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (due to 
lack of data), very small economies (population less than 1.5 million) and oil-exporting countries in the 
Middle East. See the Data Appendix for a list of countries and further details on the dataset.    
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since the mid-1980s (Figure 1).
7 For developing countries, the average restriction measure 
indicates that, after a period of liberalization in the 1970s, the trend toward openness reversed in 
the 1980s. Liberalization resumed in the early 1990s but at a slow pace. On the other hand, the 
average financial openness measure for these countries, based on actual flows, shows a modest 
increase in the 1980s, followed by a sharp rise in the 1990s. The increase in the financial 
openness measure for developing economies reflects a more rapid de facto integration than is 
captured by the relatively crude measure of capital account restrictions. 
However, the effects of financial integration in terms of increased capital flows have been 
spread very unevenly across developing countries.
8 For examining the extent of these disparities, 
it is useful to begin with a very coarse classification of the developing countries in the sample 
into two groups based on a ranking according to the average of the financial openness measure 
over the last four decades (as well as an assessment of other indicators of financial integration).  
The first group, which comprises 22 countries, is henceforth labeled as the set of More 
Financially Integrated (MFI) countries and the latter, which includes 33 countries, as the Less 
Financially Integrated (LFI) countries.
9 This distinction must be interpreted with some care at 
this stage. In particular, it is worth repeating that the criterion is a measure of de facto integration 
based on actual capital flows rather than a measure of the strength of policies designed to 
promote financial integration. Indeed, a few of the countries in the MFI group do have relatively 
closed capital accounts in a de jure sense. In general, as argued below, policy choices do 
determine the degree and nature of financial integration. Nevertheless, for the analysis in this 
paper, the degree of financial openness based on actual capital flows is a more relevant measure. 
It should be noted that the main conclusions of this paper are not crucially dependent on 
the particulars of the classification of developing countries into the MFI and LFI groups. This 
classification is obviously a static one and does not account for differences across countries in 
the timing and degree of financial integration. It is used for some of the descriptive analysis 
presented below but only in order to illustrate the conclusions from the more detailed 
econometric studies that are surveyed in the paper. The areas where this classification yields 
results different from those obtained from more formal econometric analysis will be clearly 
highlighted in the paper. The regression results reported in this paper are based on the gross 
capital flows measure described earlier which does capture differences across countries and 
changes over time in the degree of financial integration. 
Figure 2 shows that the vast majority of international private gross capital flows of 
developing countries, especially in the 1990s, are accounted for by the relatively small group of 
                                                 
7A particularly rapid decline in controls occurred during the 1980s, when the members of the European 
Community, now the European Union, liberalized capital controls. A surge in cross-border capital flows 
followed. 
8Ishii and others (2002) examine in detail the experiences of a number of developing countries. 
9Not surprisingly, this classification results in a set of MFI economies that roughly correspond to those 
included in the MSCI emerging markets stock index. The main differences are that we drop the transition 




10 By contrast, private capital flows to and from the LFI economies have 
remained very small over the last decade and, for certain types of flows, have even fallen relative 
to the late 1970s. 
B.   North-South Capital Flows 
One of the key features of global financial integration over the last decade has been the 
dramatic increase in net private capital flows from industrial countries (the “North”) to 
developing countries (the “South”). Figure 3 breaks down the levels of these flows into the four 
main constituent categories. The main increase has been in terms of FDI and portfolio flows, 
while the relative importance of bank lending has declined somewhat. In fact, net bank lending 
turned negative for a few years during the time of the Asian crisis. 
The bulk of the surge in net FDI flows from the advanced economies has gone to 
MFI economies, with only a small fraction going to LFI economies (Figure 3, lower panels). Net 
portfolio flows show a similar pattern, although both types of flows to MFI economies fell 
sharply following the Asian crisis and have remained relatively flat since then. LFI economies 
have been much more dependent on bank lending (and, although not shown here, on official 
flows including loans and grants). There were surges in bank lending to this group of countries in 
the late 1970s and early 1990s. 
Another important feature of these flows is that they differ substantially in terms of 
volatility. Table 1 shows the volatility of FDI, portfolio flows and bank lending to developing 
economies. FDI flows are the least volatile of the different categories of private capital flows to 
developing economies, which is not surprising given their long-term and relatively fixed nature. 
Portfolio flows tend to be far more volatile and prone to abrupt reversals than FDI. These 
patterns hold when the MFI and LFI economies are examined separately. Even in the case of 
LFIs, the volatility of FDI flows is much lower than that of other types of flows.
11 This 
difference in the relative volatility of different categories has important implications that will be 
examined in more detail later. 
C.   Factors Underlying the Rise in North-South Capital Flows 
The surge in net private capital flows to MFIs, as well as the shifts in the composition of 
these flows, can be broken down into “pull” and “push” factors (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 
(1993)). These are related to, respectively, (i) policies and other developments in the MFIs and 
(ii) changes in global financial markets. The first category includes factors such as stock market 
                                                 
10Note that the scale of the upper graph is twice as big as the lower one. 
11Consistent with these results, Taylor and Sarno (1999) find that FDI flows are more persistent than other 
types of flows. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) find weaker confirmation of this result and also 
note that, although the volatility of FDI flows has been rising over time, it remains lower than that of 
other types of flows. In interpreting these results, there is a valid concern about potential misclassification 
of the different types of capital flows. Since most of the studies cited here use similar data sources, this is 
not a problem that can be easily resolved by examining the conclusions of multiple studies.    
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liberalizations and privatization of state-owned companies that have stimulated foreign inflows. 
The second category includes the growing importance of depositary receipts and cross-listings 
and the emergence of institutional investors as key players driving international capital flows to 
emerging markets. 
The investment opportunities afforded by stock market liberalizations, which have 
typically included the provision of access to foreign investors, have enhanced capital flows 
to MFIs. How much have restrictions on foreign investors’ access to local stock markets in MFIs 
changed over time? To answer this question, it is useful to examine a new measure of stock 
market liberalization that captures restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic equities. This 
measure, constructed by Edison and Warnock (2001), is obviously just one component of capital 
controls, but an appropriate one for modeling equity flows. Figure 4 shows that stock market 
liberalizations in MFI economies in different regions have proceeded rapidly, in terms of both 
intensity and speed.
12 
Mergers and acquisitions, especially those resulting from the privatization of state-owned 
companies, were an important factor underlying the increase in FDI flows to MFIs during the 
1990s. The easing of restrictions on foreign participation in the financial sector in MFIs has also 
provided a strong impetus to this factor.
13 
Institutional investors in the industrial countries—including mutual funds, pension funds, 
hedge funds, and insurance companies—have assumed an important role in channeling capital 
flows from industrial to developing economies. They have helped individual investors overcome 
the information and transaction cost barriers that previously limited portfolio allocations to 
emerging markets. Mutual funds, in particular, have served as an important instrument for 
individuals to diversify their portfolios into developing country holdings.
14 Although 
international institutional investors devote only a small fraction of their portfolios to holdings in 
                                                 
12The stock market liberalization index is based on two indices constructed by the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) for each country—the Global Index (IFCG) and the Investable Index (IFCI). The IFCG 
represents the full market while the IFCI represents the portion of the market available to foreign 
investors, where availability is determined by the IFC based on legal and liquidity criteria. Edison and 
Warnock (2001) propose using the ratio of the market capitalization of the IFCG to that of the IFCI as a 
measure of stock market liberalization. This ratio provides a quantitative measure of the degree of access 
that foreign investors have to a particular country’s equity markets; one minus this ratio can be interpreted 
a measure of the intensity of capital controls in this dimension. 
13The World Bank’s Global Development Finance Report 2001 notes that FDI in Latin America’s 
financial sector has come about through the purchases of privately-owned domestic banks, driving up the 
share of banking assets under foreign control from 8 percent in 1994 to 25 percent in 1999. In East Asia, 
foreign investors have purchased local banks in financial distress, leading to an increase in the share of 
banking assets under foreign control from 2 percent in 1994 to 6 percent in 1999. 
14The presence of mutual funds in MFIs has grown substantially during the 1990s. For example, dedicated 
emerging market equity funds held $21 billion in Latin American stocks by end-1995. By end-1997, their 
holdings had increased to $40 billion. While mutual funds’ growth in Asia has been less pronounced, the 
presence of mutual funds is still important in many countries in that region. See Eichengreen and 
Mathieson (1998) for a detailed study on hedge funds.    
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MFIs, they have an important presence in these economies, given the relatively small size of 
their capital markets. Funds dedicated to emerging markets alone hold on average 5–15 percent 
of the Asian, Latin American, and transition economies’ market capitalization. 
Notwithstanding the moderation of North-South capital flows following recent emerging 
market crises, certain structural forces are likely to lead to a revival of these flows over the 
medium and long term. Demographic shifts, in particular, constitute an important driving force 
for these flows. Projected increases in old-age dependency ratios reflect the major changes in 
demographic profiles that are underway in industrial countries. This trend is likely to intensify 
further in the coming decades, fueled both by advances in medical technology that have 
increased average life spans and the decline in fertility rates. Financing the post-retirement 
consumption needs of a rapidly aging population will require increases in current saving rates, 
both national and private, in these economies. However, if such increases in saving rates do 
materialize, they are likely to result in a declining rate of return on capital in advanced 
economies, especially relative to that in the capital-poor countries of the South. This will lead to 
natural tendencies for capital to flow to countries where it has a potentially higher return. 
All of these forces imply that, despite the recent sharp reversals in North-South capital 
flows, developing countries will eventually once again face the delicate balance of opportunities 
and risks afforded by financial globalization. Are the benefits derived from financial integration 
sufficient to offset the costs of increased exposure to the vagaries of international capital flows? 
The paper now turns to an examination of the evidence on this question. 
III.   FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Theoretical models have identified a number of channels through which international 
financial integration can help to promote economic growth in the developing world. However, it 
has proven difficult to empirically identify a strong and robust causal relationship between 
financial integration and growth.  
A.   Potential Benefits of Financial Globalization in Theory 
In theory, there are a number of direct and indirect channels through which embracing 
financial globalization can help enhance growth in developing countries. Figure 5 provides a 
schematic summary of these possible channels. These channels are inter-related in some ways, 
but this delineation is useful for reviewing the empirical evidence on the quantitative importance 
of each channel.
 15 
                                                 
15 Some of these channels are also in play in transmitting the beneficial effects of globalization to the 
poor. For example, augmentation of domestic savings, reduction in the cost of capital, transfer of 
technological know-how, and stimulation of domestic financial sector development could all provide 
direct growth benefits which in turn help reduce poverty. Agenor (2003), Easterly (2004) and Goldberg 




Augmentation of domestic savings  
North-South capital flows in principle benefit both groups. They allow for increased 
investment in capital-poor countries while they provide a higher return on capital than is 
available in capital-rich countries. This effectively reduces the risk-free rate in the developing 
countries. 
Reduction in the cost of capital through better global allocation of risk 
International asset pricing models predict that stock market liberalization improves the 
allocation of risk (Henry (2000), and Stulz (1999a,b)). First, increased risk sharing opportunities 
between foreign and domestic investors might help to diversify risks. This ability to diversify in 
turn encourages firms to take on more total investment, thereby enhancing growth. Third, as 
capital flows increase, the domestic stock market becomes more liquid, which could further 
reduce the equity risk premium, thereby lowering the cost of raising capital for investment. 
 
Transfer of technological and managerial know-how 
Financially integrated economies seem to attract a disproportionately large share of FDI 
inflows, which have the potential to generate technology spillovers and to serve as a conduit for 
passing on better management practices. These spillovers can raise aggregate productivity and, in 
turn, boost economic growth (Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991a, 1991b)). 
Stimulation of domestic financial sector development 
It has already been noted that international portfolio flows can increase the liquidity of 
domestic stock markets. Increased foreign ownership of domestic banks can also generate a 
variety of other benefits (Levine (1996); Caprio and Honohan (1999)). First, foreign bank 
participation can facilitate access to international financial markets. Second, it can help improve 
the regulatory and supervisory framework of the domestic banking industry. Third, foreign banks 
often introduce a variety of new financial instruments and techniques and also foster 
technological improvements in domestic markets. The entry of foreign banks tends to increase 
competition which, in turn, can improve the quality of domestic financial services as well as 
allocative efficiency.  
Indirect Channels 
Promotion of specialization 
The notion that specialization in production may increase productivity and growth is 
intuitive. However, without any mechanism for risk management, a highly specialized    
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production structure will produce high output volatility and, hence, high consumption volatility. 
Concerns about exposure to such increases in volatility may discourage countries from taking up 
growth-enhancing specialization activities; the higher volatility will also generally imply lower 
overall savings and investment rates. In principle, financial globalization could play a useful role 
by helping countries to engage in international risk sharing and thereby reduce consumption 
volatility. This point will be taken up again in the next section. Here, it should just be noted that 
risk sharing would indirectly encourage specialization, which in turn would raise the growth rate. 
This logic is explained by Brainard and Cooper (1968), Kemp and Liviatan (1973), Ruffin 
(1974), and Imbs and Wacziarg (2003). Among developed countries and across regions within 
given developed countries, there is indeed some evidence that better risk sharing is associated 
with higher specialization (Kalemi-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2001)). 
Commitment to better economic policies 
International financial integration could increase productivity in an economy through its 
impact on the government’s ability to credibly commit to a future course of policies. More 
specifically, the disciplining role of financial integration could change the dynamics of domestic 
investment in an economy to the extent that it leads to a reallocation of capital towards more 
productive activities in response to changes in macroeconomic policies. National governments 
are occasionally tempted to institute predatory tax policies on physical capital. The prospect of 
such policies tends to discourage investment and reduce growth. Financial opening can be self-
sustaining and constrains the government from engaging in such predatory policies in the future 
since the negative consequences of such actions are far more severe under financial integration. 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) illustrate this point in a theoretical model.  
Signaling  
A country’s willingness to undertake financial integration could be interpreted as a signal 
that it is going to practice more friendly policies towards foreign investment in the future. 
Bartolini and Drazen (1997a) suggest that the removal of restrictions on capital outflows can, 
though its signaling role, lead to an increase in capital inflows. Many countries, including 
Colombia, Egypt, Italy, New Zealand, Mexico, Spain, Uruguay, and the United Kingdom have 
received significant capital inflows after removing restrictions on capital outflows.
16 
B.   Empirical Evidence 
On the surface, there seems to be a positive association between embracing financial 
globalization and the level of economic development. Industrial countries in general are more 
financially integrated with the global economy than developing countries. So embracing 
globalization is apparently part of being economically advanced. 
Within the developing world, it is also the case that more financially integrated (MFI) 
economies grew faster than less financially integrated (LFI) economies over the last three 
                                                 
16See Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) and Labán and Larrain (1997).    
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decades. From 1970 to 1999, average output per capita rose almost threefold in the group of MFI 
developing economies, almost six times greater than the corresponding increase for 
LFI economies. This pattern of higher growth for the former group applies over each of the three 
decades and also to consumption and investment growth. 
However, there are two problems with concluding a positive effect of financial 
integration on growth from this data pattern. First, this pattern may be fragile upon closer 
scrutiny. Second, these observations only reflect an association between international financial 
integration and economic performance rather than necessarily a causal relationship. In other 
words, these observations do not rule out the possibility that there is reverse causation: countries 
that manage to enjoy a robust growth may also choose to engage in financial integration even if 
financial globalization does not directly contribute to faster growth in a quantitatively significant 
way. 
To obtain an intuitive impression of the relationship between financial openness and 
growth, Table 2 presents a list of the fastest growing developing economies during 1980–2000 
and a list of the slowest growing (or fastest declining) economies during the same period. Some 
countries have undergone financial integration during this period, especially in the latter half of 
the 1990s.
17 Therefore, any result based on total changes over this long period should be 
interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, several features of the table are noteworthy. 
An obvious observation that can be made from the table is that financial integration is not 
a necessary condition for achieving a high growth rate. China and India have achieved high 
growth rates despite somewhat limited and selective capital account liberalization. For example, 
while China became substantially more open to foreign direct investment, it was not particularly 
open to most other types of cross-border capital flows. Mauritius and Botswana have managed to 
achieve very strong growth rates during the period, although they are relatively closed to 
financial flows. 
The second observation that can be made is that financial integration is not a sufficient 
condition for a fast economic growth rate either. For example, Jordan and Peru had become 
relatively open to foreign capital flows during the period; yet, their economies suffered a decline 
rather than enjoying positive growth during the period. On the other hand, Table 2 also suggests 
that declining economies are more likely to be financially closed, though the direction of 
causality is not clear as explained before. 
This way of looking at country cases with extreme growth performance is only 
informative up to a point; it needs to be supplemented by a comprehensive examination of the 
experience of a broader set of countries using a more systematic approach to measuring financial 
openness. To illustrate this relationship more broadly, Figure 6 presents a scatter plot of the 
growth rate of real per capita GDP against the increase in financial integration over 1982–97. 
                                                 
17Table 2 reports the growth rates of real per capita GDP in constant local currency units. The exact 
growth rates and country rankings may change if different measures such as per capita GDP in dollar 
terms or on a PPP basis are used.    
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There is essentially no association between these variables. Figure 7 presents a scatter plot of 
these two variables after taking into account the effects of a country’s initial income, initial 
schooling, average investment-to-GDP ratio, political instability and regional location. Again, 
the figure does not suggest a positive association between financial integration and economic 
growth. In fact, this finding is not unique to the particular choice of the time period or the 
country coverage as reflected in a broad survey of other research papers on the subject. 
A number of empirical studies have tried to systematically examine whether financial 
integration contributes to growth using various approaches to dealing with the difficult problem 
of proving causation. Table 3 summarizes the 14 most recent studies on this subject.
18 Three out 
of the fourteen papers report a positive effect of financial integration on growth. However, the 
majority of the papers tend to find no effect or a mixed effect for developing countries. This 
suggests that, if financial integration has a positive effect on growth, it is probably not strong or 
robust.
19 
Of the papers summarized in Table 3, the one by Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk (2002) 
is perhaps the most thorough and comprehensive in terms of measures of financial integration 
and in terms of empirical specifications. These authors measure a country’s degree of financial 
integration both by the government’s restrictions on capital account transactions as recorded in 
the IMF’s AREAER and by the observed size of capital flows crossing the border, normalized by 
the size of the economy. The data set in that paper goes through 2000, the latest year analyzed in 
any existing study on this subject. Furthermore, the authors also employ a statistical 
methodology that allows them to deal with possible reverse causality—i.e., the possibility that 
any observed association between financial integration and growth could result from the 
mechanism that faster growing economies also more likely to choose to liberalize their capital 
accounts. After a battery of statistical analyses, that paper concludes that, overall, there is no 
robustly significant effect of financial integration on economic growth. 
C.   Synthesis 
Why is it so difficult to find a strong and robust effect of financial integration on 
economic growth for developing countries, when the theoretical basis for this result is apparently 
so strong? Perhaps there is some logic to this outcome after all. A number of researchers have 
now concluded that most of the differences in income per capita across countries stem not from 
differences in capital-labor ratios, but from differences in total factor productivity, which, in 
turn, could be explained by “soft” factors or “social infrastructure” like governance, rule of law, 
                                                 
18This extends the survey in World Economic Outlook, October 2001, and Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk 
(2002). 
19As discussed in Appendix I, there is some evidence that different types of capital flows may have 
different effects on growth. Recent research suggests that FDI flows are positively associated with 
domestic investment and output growth in a relatively consistent manner. For example, Bosworth and 
Collins (1999) find that while the impact of portfolio flows on investment growth is quite minor, there is a 
strong positive relationship between FDI flows and investment growth. In particular, their findings 
suggest that there exists an almost one-for-one relationship between FDI flows and domestic investment.    
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and respect for property rights.
20 In this case, while financial integration may open the door for 
additional capital to come in from abroad, it is unlikely to offer a major boost to growth by itself. 
In fact, if domestic governance is sufficiently weak, financial integration could cause an exodus 
of domestic capital and, hence, lower the growth rate of an economy. 
This logic can be illustrated using the results reported in Senhadji (2000). Over the period 
1960 to 1994, the average growth rate of per capita output for the group of countries in sub-
Saharan Africa was the lowest among regional groupings of developing countries. The difference 
in physical and human capital accumulation is only part of the story for why growth rates differ 
across countries. The gap in total factor productivity is the major element in explaining the 
difference in the growth rates. 
Another possible explanation for why it is difficult to detect a causal effect of financial 
integration on growth is the costly banking crises that some developing countries have 
experienced in the process of financial integration. The results in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
suggest that a flawed sequencing of domestic financial liberalization, when accompanied by 
capital account liberalization, increases the chance of domestic banking crises and/or exchange 
rate crises. These crises are often accompanied by output collapses. As a result, the benefits from 
financial integration may not be evident in the data.
21 
It is interesting to contrast the empirical literature on the effects of financial integration 
with that on the effects of trade integration. There is a large literature suggesting that openness to 
trade has a positive impact on growth (e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995; Frankel and Romer, 1999; 
Dollar and Kraay, 2002; and Wacziarg and Welch, 2003), although some of the findings in this 
literature have been challenged by Rodriquez and Rodrik (2000), who raise questions about the 
measures of trade openness and the econometric methods employed in these studies. 
Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of empirical papers employing various techniques, 
including country case studies as well as cross-country regressions, find that trade openness 
helps to promote economic growth. In a recent paper that surveys all the prominent empirical 
research on the subject, Berg and Krueger (2002) conclude that “[v]aried evidence supports the 
view that trade openness contributes greatly to growth.” Furthermore, “[c]ross-country 
                                                 
20See Hall and Jones (1999), Senhadji (2000), Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and 
Levine (2001), and Rogoff (2002) on the role of productivity difference in explaining cross-country 
difference in income. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) is the only paper that has made a direct comparision 
between gains from international financial integration and those from a rise in productivity.  In a 
calibrated model, they show that the welfare gain from perfect financial integration is roughly equivalent 
to a one percent permanent increase in consumption for the typical non-OECD economy. By contrast, a 
productivity increase of the order of magnitude experienced in post-war Korea yields a welfare benefit 
that is more than one hundred times larger. The low gains from international financial integration comes 
from the fact that less developed countries are on average not very far from their potential level of capital. 
Non-OECD countries are less developed not primarily because they are capital-scarce, but because 
productivity is constrained by quality of institutions, economic policies and other factors. 
21 See Ishii et. al. (2002) for country cases in this regard.    
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regressions of the level of income on various determinants generally show that openness is the 
most important policy variable.”
22 
The differential effects between trade and financial integration are echoed in recent 
empirical research (see Appendix II). As an alternative to examining the effect on economic 
growth or level of income, one can examine the effects of trade and financial openness on a 
society’s health status. Using data on 79 developing countries, Wei and Wu (2002a) report 
several pieces of evidence suggesting that a faster increase in trade openness—especially when 
measured by the reduction in tariff rates—is associated with a faster increase in life expectancy 
and a faster reduction in infant mortality, even after one takes into account the effect of income, 
institutions, and other factors. In contrast, higher financial integration is not associated with a 
faster improvement in a society’s health status. This suggests that, in health dimension, as in the 
growth literature, it is harder to find a beneficial role for financial integration compared to trade 
integration for developing countries.
23 
In related research, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2004) analyze how trade and financial 
integration affect the relationship between growth and volatility. Running various regression 
models, first Ramey and Ramey (1995), then several other researchers (Martin and Rogers 
(2000), Fatas (2003) and Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003)), document that volatility and growth 
are negatively correlated. The results by Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2004) suggest that trade 
and financial integration weaken the negative growth-volatility relationship. Specifically, in 
regressions of growth on volatility and other control variables, they find that the estimated 
coefficients on interactions between volatility and trade integration are significantly positive. In 
other words, countries that are more open to trade appear to face a less severe tradeoff between 
growth and volatility. They report a similar, although slightly less robust, result for the 
interaction of financial integration with volatility. 
It is useful to note that there may be a complementary relationship between trade and 
financial openness.
24 For example, if a country has severe trade barriers protecting some 
inefficient domestic industries, then capital inflows may end up being directed to those 
industries, thereby exacerbating the existing misallocation of resources. Thus, there is a concrete 
                                                 
22 Baldwin (2003), Winters (2004) and Tang and Harrison (2004) also provide surveys of the literature on 
trade liberalization and economic growth. Winters (2004) concludes that “while there are serious 
methodological challenges and disagreements about the strength of the evidence, the most plausible 
conclusion is that liberalization generally induces a temporary (but possibly long-lived) increase in 
growth.” Tang and Harrison (2004) argue that “while trade integration can strengthen an effective growth 
strategy, it cannot ensure its effectiveness. Other elements are needed, such as sound macroeconomic 
management, building trade-related infrastructure, and trade related institutions, economy-wide 
investments in human capital and infrastructure, or building strong institutions.” 
23 The contrast between financial and trade openness may have important lessons for policies. While there 
appear to be relatively few prerequisites for deriving benefits from trade openness, obtaining benefits 
from financial integration requires several conditions to be in place (this is discussed in more detail in 
Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose, 2003, Chapter V). 
24 This point is stressed in the September 2002 World Economic Outlook.    
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channel through which financial openness without trade openness could lower a country’s level 
of efficiency. 
Of course, the lack of a strong and robust effect of financial integration on economic 
growth does not necessarily imply that theories that make this connection are wrong. One could 
argue that the theories are about the long-run effects, and most theories abstract from the nitty-
gritty of institutional building, governance improvement, and other “soft” factors that are 
necessary ingredients for the hypothesized channels to take effect. Indeed, developing countries 
may have little choice but to strengthen their financial linkages eventually in order to improve 
their growth potential in the long run. The problem is how to manage the short-run risks 
apparently associated with financial globalization. Financial integration without a proper set of 
preconditions might lead to few growth benefits and more output and consumption volatility in 
the short run, a subject that is taken up in the next section. 
Since growth and poverty reduction are intimately related, then the question of how 
financial globalization affects growth is closely linked to the question of how financial 
globalization affects poverty. The fact that the evidence on growth is indecisive almost surely 
implies that evidence on poverty reduction is as well.
 Recent research confirms this conclusion. 
For example, Easterly (2004) documents that neither financial nor trade flows have any 
significant impact on poverty. On the other hand, research by Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004) 
suggests that increased trade flows could lead to higher economic growth which in turn could 
reduce poverty. Kraay (2004) provides strong evidence for the importance of economic growth 
in poverty reduction as his analysis shows that most of the variation in changes in poverty during 
the 1980s and 1990s is explained by growth in average income in developing countries. Agenor 
(2003) finds that there is a nonlinear relationship between globalization and poverty. His 
empirical results indicate that while globalization could reduce poverty in countries with a higher 
degree of economic integration, it could have an adverse impact on the income levels of the poor 
in countries with a lower degree of integration.
 25 This nonlinearity stems from the fact that 
globalization has a sizeable impact on the quality of institutions only beyond a certain level of 
trade and financial integration and institutions (including an efficient social safety net) play a 
major role in channeling the beneficial effects of globalization to the poor and shielding them 
from its costs.  
Although there has been an intensive debate about the potentially adverse impact of 
globalization on income inequality, there is no clear empirical evidence that globalization has 
fostered a sharp rise in worldwide inequality. Several recent studies focus on the impact of 
globalization on income inequality across countries, these studies have yet to provide a 
conclusive answer. For example, globalization could accentuate the already substantial inequality 
of national incomes and, in particular, lead to stagnation of incomes and living standards in 
countries that do not participate in this process. Consistent with this view, Quah (1997) has 
documented that there is evidence in cross-country data of a “twin peaks” phenomenon whereby 
per capita incomes converge within each of two groups of countries (advanced countries and 
                                                 
25 Agenor (2003) uses a weighted average of trade and financial openness indicators as a measure of 
economic integration.     
 
21 
globalizers) while average incomes continue to diverge across these two groups of countries. In 
other words, advanced countries and globalizers converge in terms of per capita incomes and so 
do non-globalizers, but these two groups diverge from each other in terms of their average 
incomes. Sala-i-Martin (2002), on the other hand, argues that a more careful analysis, using 
individuals rather than countries as the units of analysis, shows that global inequality has 
declined during the recent wave of globalization.  
By the same token, if the institutional preconditions for financial globalization to benefit 
growth are in place, then it is likely financial globalization will help to alleviate poverty as well. 
IV.   FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY 
International financial integration should, in principle, help countries to reduce 
macroeconomic volatility. The survey presented in this section, including some new evidence, 
suggests that developing countries, in particular, have not attained this potential benefit. The 
process of capital account liberalization has often been accompanied by increased vulnerability 
to crises. Globalization has heightened these risks since financial linkages have the potential of 
amplifying the effects of both real and financial shocks. 
Holding growth constant, higher macroeconomic volatility would normally be associated 
with an increase in inequality of income, and therefore measures of poverty based on inequality. 
If the growth benefits are large – as indeed they may well be though the evidence is clearly very 
mixed – then of course, increased financial integration may increase relative poverty measures in 
the short run while reducing absolute (but not necessarily relative) poverty measures in the 
longer run.
26 
A.   Macroeconomic Volatility
27 
One of the potential benefits of globalization is that it should provide better opportunities 
for reducing volatility by diversifying risks. Indeed, these benefits are presumably even greater 
for developing countries that are intrinsically subject to higher volatility on account of their 
being less diversified than industrial economies in terms of their production structures. However, 
recent crises in some MFIs suggest that financial integration may in fact have increased 
volatility. 
What is the overall evidence of the effect of globalization on macroeconomic volatility? 
In addressing this question, it is important to make a distinction between output and consumption 
volatility. In theoretical models, the direct effects of global integration on output volatility are 
ambiguous. Financial integration provides access to capital that can help capital-poor developing 
countries to diversify their production base. On the other hand, rising financial integration could 
also lead to increasing specialization of production based on comparative advantage 
                                                 
26 Mechanically, a rise in the volatility of consumption could lead to a decrease in the poverty head count. 
However, the increase in the volatility of consumption adversely affects the poor households’ welfare.  
27This subsection draws heavily on Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a).    
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considerations, thereby making economies more vulnerable to shocks that are specific to 
industries (Razin and Rose (1994)). 
Irrespective of the effects on output volatility, theory suggests that financial integration 
should reduce consumption volatility. The ability to reduce fluctuations in consumption is 
regarded as an important determinant of economic welfare. Access to international financial 
markets provides better opportunities for countries to share macroeconomic risk and, thereby, 
smooth consumption. The basic idea here is that, since output fluctuations are not perfectly 
correlated across countries, trade in financial assets can be used to delink national consumption 
levels from the country-specific components of these output fluctuations (see Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1998), Chapter 5). Appendix III provides a detailed analytical examination of this issue 
and shows that the gains from consumption smoothing are potentially very large for developing 
economies. 
Notwithstanding the importance of this issue, the empirical evidence on the effects 
of globalization on macroeconomic volatility is rather sparse and, in particular, the evidence 
concerning the effects of financial integration on volatility is limited and inconclusive (see 
Appendix IV). In addition, the existing literature has largely been devoted to analyzing the 
effects of financial integration on output volatility, with little attention paid to consumption 
volatility. Hence, this paper now provides some new evidence on this topic. 
Table 4 examines changes in volatility for different macroeconomic aggregates over the 
last four decades. Consistent with evidence presented in the September 2002 World Economic 
Outlook, MFI economies on average have lower output volatility than LFI economies. 
Interestingly, there is a significant decline in average output volatility in the 1990s for both 
industrial and LFI economies but a far more modest decline for MFI economies. The picture is 
similar for a broader measure of income that includes factor income flows and terms of trade 
effects, which are particularly important for developing countries. Figure 8 (top panel), which 
shows the evolution of the average volatility of income growth for different groups of countries, 
confirms these results and shows that they are not sensitive to the decade-wise breakdown of the 
data, although there is a pick-up in volatility for MFIs towards the end of the sample.
28 
The third panel of this table shows that average consumption volatility in the 1990s has 
declined in line with output volatility for both industrial economies and LFI economies. By 
contrast, for MFI economies, the volatility of private consumption has in fact risen in the 1990s 
relative to the 1980s for MFI economies. It is possible that looking at the volatility of private 
consumption is misleading as public consumption could be playing an important smoothing role, 
especially in developing economies. It is true, as shown in the fourth panel of Table 4, that total 
consumption is generally less volatile than private consumption. However, these results confirm 
the pattern that, on average, consumption volatility for industrial and LFI economies declined in 
the 1990s. By contrast, it increases for MFI economies over the same period. Figure 8 (lower 
panel), which shows the evolution of the average volatility of total consumption growth over a 
                                                 
28The figure shows the median standard deviation of income growth for each country group, based on 
standard deviations calculated for each country over a ten-year rolling window.    
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ten-year rolling window, yields a similar picture. Could this simply be a consequence of higher 
income volatility for MFI economies? 
Strikingly, for the group of MFI countries, the volatility of total consumption relative to 
that of income has actually increased in the 1990s relative to earlier periods. The bottom panel of 
Table 4 shows the median ratio of the volatility of total consumption growth to that of income 
growth for each group of countries. For MFI economies, this ratio increases from 0.76 in the 
1980s to 0.92 in the 1990s, while it remains essentially unchanged for the other two groups of 
countries. Thus, the increase in the 1990s of the volatility of consumption relative to that of 
income for the MFI economies suggests that financial integration has not provided better 
consumption smoothing opportunities for these economies.
29 
More formal econometric evidence is presented by Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a), 
who use measures of capital account restrictions as well as gross financial flows to capture 
different aspects of financial integration, as well as differences in the degree of integration across 
countries and over time. This analysis confirms the increase in the relative volatility of 
consumption for countries that have larger financial flows, even after controlling for 
macroeconomic variables as well as country characteristics such as trade openness and industrial 
structure. However, these authors also identify an important threshold effect—beyond a 
particular level, financial integration significantly reduces volatility. Most developing 
economies, including MFI economies, are unfortunately well below this threshold.
30 
Why has the relative volatility of consumption increased precisely in those developing 
countries that are more open to financial flows? One explanation is that positive productivity and 
output growth shocks during the late 1980s and early 1990s in these countries led to 
consumption booms that were willingly financed by international investors. These consumption 
booms were accentuated by the fact that many of these countries undertook domestic financial 
liberalization at the same time that they opened up to international financial flows, thereby 
loosening liquidity constraints at both the individual and national levels. When negative shocks 
hit these economies, however, they rapidly lost access to international capital markets. For the 
financial integration measure used in this paper, the threshold occurs at a ratio of about 50 
percent of GDP. The countries in the sample that have a degree of financial integration above 
this threshold are all industrial countries. 
Consistent with this explanation, a growing literature suggests that the procyclical nature 
of capital flows appears to have had an adverse impact on consumption volatility in developing 
economies.
31 One manifestation of this procyclicality is the phenomenon of “sudden stops” of 
                                                 
29It should be noted that, despite the increase in the 1990s, the volatility of both private and total 
consumption for the MFI economies is, on average, still lower than for LFI economies. 
30For the financial integration measure used in this paper, the threshold occurs at a ratio of about 50 
percent of GDP. The countries in the sample that have a degree of financial integration above this 
threshold are all industrial countries. 
31The notion of procylicality here is that capital inflows are positively correlated with domestic business 
cycle conditions in these countries.     
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capital inflows (see Calvo and Reinhart (1999)). More generally, access to international capital 
markets has a procyclical element, which tends to generate higher output volatility as well as 
excess consumption volatility (relative to that of income). Reinhart (2002), for instance, finds 
that sovereign bond ratings are procyclical. Since the spreads on bonds of developing economies 
are strongly influenced by these ratings, this implies that costs of borrowing on international 
markets are procyclical as well. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2002) present more direct evidence on 
the procyclical behavior of capital inflows.
32 
B.   Crises as Special Cases of Volatility 
Crises can be regarded as particularly dramatic episodes of volatility. In fact, the 
proliferation of financial crises is often viewed as one of the defining aspects of the 
intensification of financial globalization over the last two decades. Furthermore, the fact that 
recent crises have affected mainly MFI economies has led to these phenomena being regarded as 
hallmarks of the unequal distribution of globalization’s benefits and risks. This raises a 
challenging set of questions about whether the nature of crises has changed over time, what 
factors increase vulnerability to crises, and whether such crises are an inevitable concomitant of 
globalization. 
Some aspects of financial crises have indeed changed over time while, in other respects, 
it is often déjà vu all over again. Calvo (1998) has referred to such episodes in the latter half of 
the 1980s and 1990s as capital account crises, while earlier ones are referred to as current 
account crises. Although this suggests differences in the mechanics of crises, it does not 
necessarily imply differences in some of their fundamental causes. Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) discuss the phenomenon of “twin crises,” which involve balance-of-payments and 
banking crises. These authors also make the important point that, in the episodes that they 
analyze, banking sector problems typically precede a currency crisis and that the currency crisis 
then deepens the banking crisis, activating a vicious spiral. In this vein, Krueger and Yoo (2002) 
conclude that imprudent lending by the Korean banks in the early and mid-1990s, especially to 
the Chaebols, played a significant role in the 1997 Korean currency crisis. Opening up to capital 
markets can thus exacerbate such existing domestic distortions and lead to catastrophic 
consequences (Aizenman (2002)). 
One key difference in the evolution of crises is that, while the 1970s and 1980s featured 
crises that affected both industrial and developing economies, these have become almost 
exclusively the preserve of developing economies since the mid 1990s.
33 This suggests either 
that advanced economies have been able to better protect themselves through improved policies 
                                                 
32The World Bank’s Global Development Finance Report (2001) also finds some evidence of such 
procyclicality and notes that the response of capital inflows is typically twice as large when a developing 
country faces an adverse shock to GDP growth as when it faces a favorable shock. This is attributed to the 
fact that credit ratings are downgraded more rapidly during adverse shocks than they are upgraded during 
favorable ones. 
33In fact, in the 1990s, the ERM crisis is the only significant one among industrial countries. The 
prolonged Japanese recession is in some sense a crisis although the protracted nature of Japan’s decline, 
which has not featured any sudden falls in output, would not fit into a standard definition of a crisis.     
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or that the fundamental causes of crises have changed over time, thereby increasing the relative 
vulnerability of developing economies. In this context, it should be noted that, while capital 
flows from advanced economies to MFI economies have increased sharply, these flows among 
industrial economies have jumped even more sharply in recent years, as noted earlier. Thus, at 
least in terms of volume of capital flows, it is not obvious that changes in financial integration 
can by themselves be blamed for crises in MFI economies. 
Is it reasonable to accept crises as a natural feature of globalization, much as business 
cycles are viewed as a natural occurrence in market economies? One key difference between 
these phenomena is that the overall macroeconomic costs of financial crises are typically very 
large and far more persistent. Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) document that emerging market 
currency crises, that are typically accompanied by sudden stops or reversals of external capital 
inflows, are associated with significant negative output effects.
34 Such recessions following 
devaluations (or large depreciations) are also found to be much deeper in emerging markets than 
in developed economies. In addition, the absence of well-functioning safety nets can greatly 
exacerbate the social costs of crises, which typically have large distributional consequences (see, 
e.g., Baldacci, de Mello, and Inchauste (2002)).
35 
What is the impact on poverty of macroeconomic volatility associated with greater 
openness to trade and financial flows on poverty? Mechanically, an increase in the volatility of 
consumption could lead to a decrease in the poverty head count. However, the increase in the 
volatility of consumption adversely affects the poor households’ welfare. Recent research 
examines various implications of  macroeconomic volatility and financial crises on the dynamics 
of consumption and poverty in developing countries. For example, Duygan (2004) documents 
that household expenditure decreased by 5 percent on average during financial crises in sixteen 
developing countries. Some recent studies focus on the permanent impact of temporary negative 
income shocks on poverty. For example, Lustig (2002) concludes that crises in Latin America 
adversely affected the human capital of the poor and have had a permanent impact on poverty 
and inequality by diminishing the potential of the poor to escape poverty. Agenor (2002) studies 
the asymmetric effects of macroeconomic fluctuations and crises on poverty. He finds that while 
                                                 
34Currency crises can also affect firms directly and, by exacerbating the problems of the banking sector, 
can lead to a broader credit crunch, even for productive and solvent firms. Mishkin (1999) argues that the 
credit crunch resulting from sharp contractions in domestic bank credit following financial crises has been 
instrumental in aggravating these crises and reducing investment and economic activity. Rodrik and 
Velasco (2000) note that difficulties in rolling over short-term debt during crisis episodes rapidly squeeze 
the availability of liquidity, with immediate effects on investment and output. 
35 Work by Wu and Wei (2001) using Chinese regional data shows that increases in trade openness are 
negatively associated with changes in inequality. However, the process of financial and trade 
liberalization can sometimes have negative distributional consequences within a country, especially in the 
short run. Attempts to address these issues using ad hoc redistributive measures can often result in 
distortions that adversely affect long-term growth. Nevertheless, given the vital need to maintain socio-
political stability while undertaking significant reforms and liberalization, there is a need for judicious 
design and use of social safety nets to protect the economically vulnerable segments of the population.     
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the effects of shocks to income on poverty are quite small during periods of crisis, these shocks 
could decrease poverty during expansions.
36 
 
C.   Has Financial Globalization Intensified the Transmission of Volatility? 
What factors have led to the rising vulnerability of developing economies to financial 
crises? The risk of sudden stops or reversals of global capital flows to developing countries has 
increased in importance as many developing countries now rely heavily on borrowing from 
foreign banks or portfolio investment by foreign investors. These capital flows are sensitive not 
just to domestic conditions in the recipient countries but also to macroeconomic conditions in 
industrial countries. For instance, Mody and Taylor (2002), using an explicit disequilibrium 
econometric framework, detect instances of “international capital crunch”—where capital flows 
to developing countries are curtailed by supply-side rationing that reflects industrial country 
conditions.
37 These North-South financial linkages, in addition to the real linkages described in 
earlier sections, represent an additional channel through which business cycles and other shocks 
that hit industrial countries can affect developing countries. 
The effects of industrial country macroeconomic conditions, including the stage of the 
business cycle and interest rates, have different effects on various types of capital flows to 
emerging markets. Reinhart and Reinhart (2001) document that net FDI flows to emerging 
market economies are strongly positively correlated with U.S. business cycles. On the other 
hand, bank lending to these economies is negatively correlated with U.S. cycles. Edison and 
Warnock (2001) find that portfolio equity flows from the United States to major emerging 
market countries are negatively correlated with both U.S. interest rates and U.S. output growth. 
This result is particularly strong for flows to Latin America and less so for flows to Asia. Thus, 
the sources of capital inflows for a particular MFI can greatly affect the nature of its vulnerability 
to the volatility of capital flows arising from industrial country disturbances.
38  
The increase in cross-country financial market correlations also indicates a risk 
of emerging markets being caught up in financial market bubbles. The rise in comovement 
across emerging and industrial country stock markets, especially during the stock market bubble 
period of the late 1990s, points to the relevance of this concern. This is a particular risk for 
relatively shallow and undiversified stock markets of some emerging economies. For instance, as 
noted earlier, the strong correlations between emerging and industrial stock markets during the 
bubble period reflects the preponderance of technology and telecommunication sectors stocks in 
                                                 
36 Recent research also studies the adverse impact of macroeconomic volatility on food security and 
hunger (see Barrett and Shan, 2001).  
37This paper examines bond, equity and syndicated loan flows to Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Thailand 
over the period 1990–2000.  
38However, notwithstanding the differences in the types of sensitivities to industrial country business 
cycle conditions, the fact still remains that FDI flows are generally less volatile and less sensitive to the 
factors discussed here than either portfolio flows or bank lending.    
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the former set of markets. It is, of course, difficult to say conclusively whether this phenomenon 
would have occurred even in the absence of financial globalization, since stock market 
liberalizations in these countries often went hand in hand with their opening up to capital flows. 
The increasing depth of stock markets in emerging economies could alleviate some 
of these risks but, at the same time, could heighten the real effects of such financial shocks. In 
this vein, Dellas and Hess (2002) find that a higher degree of financial development 
makes emerging stock markets more susceptible to external influences (both financial and 
macroeconomic) and that this effect remains important after controlling for capital controls and 
trade linkages.
39 Consequently, the effects of external shocks could be transmitted to domestic 
real activity through the stock market channel. 
Even the effects of real shocks are often transmitted faster and amplified through 
financial channels. There is a large literature showing how productivity, terms of trade, fiscal and 
other real shocks are transmitted through trade channels.
40 Cross-country investment flows, in 
particular, have traditionally responded quite strongly to country-specific shocks.
41 Financial 
channels constitute an additional avenue through which the effects of such real shocks can be 
transmitted. Furthermore, since transmission through financial channels is much quicker than 
through real channels, both the speed and magnitude of international spillovers of real shocks are 
considerably heightened by financial linkages.
42 
Rising financial linkages have also resulted in contagion effects. Potential contagion 
effects are likely to become more important over time as financial linkages increase and 
investors in search of higher returns and better diversification opportunities increase their share 
of international holdings and, due to declines in information and transaction costs, have access to 
a broader array of cross-country investment opportunities.
43 
There are two broad types of contagion identified in the literature—fundamentals-based 
contagion and “pure” contagion. The former refers to the transmission of shocks across national 
borders through real or financial linkages. In other words, while an economy may have weak 
fundamentals, it could get tipped over into a financial crisis as a consequence of investors 
reassessing the riskiness of investments in that country or attempting to rebalance their portfolios 
                                                 
39These authors use standard measures of financial sector development that are based on the competitive 
structure and the size of the financial intermediation sector in each country.  
40See Kouparitsas (1996); Blankenau, Kose, and Yi (2001); Kose and Riezman (2001); and Kose (2002).  
41See Glick and Rogoff (1997) for an empirical analysis of how country-specific productivity shocks 
affect national investment and the current account. These authors show how the responses to such shocks 
depend crucially on the persistence of the shocks. Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003) examine the impact 
of world and country-specific factors in driving fluctuations in output, consumption, and investment. 
42For instance, a shock to GDP growth in one country may be transmitted gradually through trade 
channels but could far more quickly have an impact on economic activity in another country via 
correlations in stock market fluctuations. If the two countries were perfectly integrated through trade and 
financial linkages this outcome could, of course, simply reflect an optimal risk-sharing arrangement.  
43Contagion effects aside, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003b) find that increasing financial linkages have 
only a small effect on cross-country output and consumption correlations.    
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following a crisis in another country. Similarly, bank lending can lead to such contagion effects 
when a crisis in one country to which a bank has significant exposure forces it to rebalance its 
portfolio by readjusting its lending to other countries. This bank transmission channel, 
documented in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2000) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2001), can be 
particularly potent since a large fraction of bank lending to emerging markets is in the form of 
short-maturity loans. While fundamentals-based contagion was once prevalent mainly at the 
regional level, the Russian crisis demonstrated its much broader international reach (Kaminsky 
and Reinhart (2002)).
44 
Pure contagion, on the other hand, represents a different kind of risk since it can not 
easily be influenced by domestic policies at least in the short run. There is a good deal of 
evidence of sharp swings in international capital flows that are not obviously related to changes 
in fundamentals. Investor behavior during these episodes, which is sometimes categorized as 
herding or momentum trading, is difficult to explain in the context of optimizing models with 
full and common information. Informational asymmetries, which are particularly rife in the 
context of emerging markets, appear to play an important role in this phenomenon. A related 
literature suggests that pure contagion may reflect investors’ shifting “appetite” for risk, but it is 
no doubt difficult to disentangle such changes in risk appetite from shifts in underlying risks 
themselves (Kumar and Persaud (2001)). Thus, in addition to “pure contagion,” financial 
integration exposes developing economies to the risks associated with destabilizing investor 
behavior that is not related to fundamentals.
45 
D.   Some Factors That Increase Vulnerability to the Risks of Globalization 
Empirical research indicates that the composition of capital inflows and the maturity 
structure of external debt appear to be associated with higher vulnerability to the risks of 
financial globalization. The relative importance of different sources of financing for domestic 
investment, as proxied by the following three variables, has been shown to be positively 
associated with the incidence and the severity of currency and financial crises: the ratio of bank 
borrowing or other debt relative to foreign direct investment; the shortness of the term structure 
of external debt; and the share of external debt denominated in foreign currencies.
46 Detragiache 
and Spilimbergo (2002) find strong evidence that debt crises are more likely to occur in countries 
where external debt has a short maturity.
47 However, the maturity structure may not entirely be a 
                                                 
44 Kim, Kose, and Plummer (2001) examine the roles of fundamentals based contagion and pure 
contagion during the Asian crisis. 
45Claessens and Forbes (2001) contains a compilation of essays on the different dimensions of contagion 
effects. Boyer, Gibson, and Loretan (1999), and Forbes and Rigobon (2001) argue that the evidence for 
pure contagion against the alternative of fundamentals-based contagion is very weak. Corsetti and others 
(2002) argue that, under more general assumptions, there is greater evidence of the former type of 
contagion. Bayoumi and others (2003), find evidence of “positive” contagion related with herding 
behavior of capital inflows to emerging markets. 
46See, for example, Frankel and Rose (1996), Radelet and Sachs (1998), and Rodrik and Velasco (1999). 
47Some authors have found that the currency composition of external debt also matters. Carlson and 
Hernandez (2002) note that, during the Asian crisis, countries with more yen-denominated debt fared 
(continued)    
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matter of choice since, as argued by these authors, countries with weaker macroeconomic 
fundamentals are often forced to borrow at shorter maturities since they do not have access to 
longer-maturity loans. 
In addition to basic macroeconomic policies, other policy choices of a systemic nature 
can also affect the vulnerability of MFIs. Recent currency crises have highlighted one of the 
main risks in this context. Developing countries that attempt to maintain a relatively inflexible 
exchange rate system often face the risk of attacks on their currencies. While various forms of 
fully or partially fixed exchange rate regimes can have some advantages, the absence of 
supportive domestic policies can often result in an abrupt unraveling of these regimes when 
adverse shocks hit the economy. 
Financial integration can also aggravate the risks associated with imprudent fiscal 
policies. Access to world capital markets could lead to excessive borrowing that is channeled 
into unproductive government spending. The existence of large amounts of short-term debt 
denominated in hard currencies then makes countries vulnerable to external shocks or changes in 
investor sentiment. The experience of a number of MFI countries that have suffered the 
consequences of such external debt accumulation points to the heightened risks of undisciplined 
fiscal policies when the capital account is open. 
Premature opening of the capital account also poses serious risks when financial 
regulation and supervision are inadequate.
48 In the presence of weakly regulated banking systems 
and other distortions in domestic capital markets, inflows of foreign capital could exacerbate the 
existing inefficiencies in these economies. For example, if domestic financial institutions tend to 
channel capital to firms with excessive risks or weak fundamentals, financial integration could 
simply lead to an intensification of such flows.
49 In turn, the effects of premature capital inflows 
on the balance sheets of the government and corporate sectors could have negative repercussions 
on the health of financial institutions in the event of adverse macroeconomic shocks. 
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical evidence has not established a definitive proof that financial integration 
has enhanced growth for developing countries. Furthermore, it may be associated with higher 
consumption volatility. Therefore, there may be value for developing countries to experiment 
with different paces and strategies in pursuing financial integration. Empirical evidence does 
suggest that improving governance, in addition to sound macroeconomic frameworks and the 
development of domestic financial markets, should be an important element of such strategies. 
This conclusion does not necessarily imply that a country must develop a full set of sound 
institutions matching the best practices in the world before embarking on financial integration. 
                                                                                                                                                             
significantly worse. These authors attribute this to the misalignment between the countries’ de facto 
currency pegs and the denomination of their debt. 
48See Ishii and Habermeier (2002) and Bakker and Chapple (2002).  
49Krueger and Yoo (2002), discuss the interactions of crony capitalism and capital account liberalization 
in setting the stage for the currency-financial crisis in Korea. See also, Mody (2002).    
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As emphasized in Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003, chapter 5), as a country makes progress 
on transparency, control of corruption, rule of law, and financial supervisory capacity, it will be 
in an increasingly better position to benefit from financial globalization. 
Equally important is to avoid some of the recurrent traps that countries have fallen into as 
they have moved to liberalize domestic financial markets and engineer increased financial 
globalization. If, as appears to be the case, overly fixed exchange rates are a leading determinant 
of financial crises in emerging markets, then moving to more flexible exchange rate regimes 
should greatly improve a country’s chances of being a winner from financial globalization even 
in the short term. Likewise, assuming a large external debt burden, especially if it is of a 
relatively short maturity structure, can be a damaging way to undertake financial integration.  
It is also important to stress that financial integration is not necessarily a variable that can 
be tightly controlled by policy. Capital controls, aside from coming in myriads of forms with 
effects that are difficult to manage, are often ineffective. Even in counties where they are 
relatively more effective, such controls tend to become less so over time as the rising 
sophistication of international capital markets and investors, along with the global expansion of 
trade, increase the opportunities for evading capital controls. Some of the most consistently 
financially integrated countries based on our de facto measure--including, for example, many 
Latin American countries--have often been ones where capital controls are quite stringent, at 
least on paper. On the other hand, many countries in Africa offer unimpeded capital market 
access, have not yet succeeded in achieving a significant degree of integration. 
Finally, given that we have not been able to draw strong conclusions about the empirical 
links between financial globalization, growth and macroeconomic volatility, one must conclude 
that there will almost surely be similar ambiguity in an investigation of the links between 
financial globalization and poverty, although we have not directly examined those links in this 
paper. Of course, in such an exercise one would ideally like to look at a broader range of human 
development indicators and measures of poverty than just income (for example, even in some 
countries such as Brazil that have experienced relatively slow income growth over the past 
fifteen years, educational attainment levels have continued to rise).
50  
In addition, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the complex relationship between 
globalization and poverty, one has to acknowledge that poverty is fundamentally a relative 
measure which would probably gain an entirely different meaning as the world economy become 
more integrated (Rogoff, 2004). For example, if global growth continues at a rapid pace during 
the next century, it is possible that emerging market economies, including China and India, could 
attain income levels exceeding those of Americans today by the end of the century. This implies 
that Malthusian notions of poverty are likely to become a distant memory in most parts of the 
world as global income inexorably expands over the next century, and issues of inequality, rather 
than subsistence, will increasingly take center stage in the poverty debate.  
                                                 
50 Ravallion (2003) argues that differences in the concept and definitions of poverty could lead to 
different conclusions about the impact of globalization on poverty and inequality.     
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The results that we have highlighted in this paper provide a framework in which to 
examine the different channels through which the forces of financial globalization could affect 
poverty and inequality outcomes. A great deal of additional work is clearly called for to gain a 
better understanding of these dimensions of the effects of financial globalization.    
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Figure 1. Measures of Financial Integration 
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Figure 2. Gross Capital Flows 
(Percent of GDP)  
Source: WEO, IFS
Note that the left scales on the two panels are different
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Figure 3. Net Private Capital Flows 
(Billions of U.S. dollars) 
Source: WEO 
   
Note: Bank lending to the More Financially Integrated Economies was negative between 1997 and 1999. 
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Figure 4. Foreign Ownership Restrictions 
(More Financially Integrated Developing Economies) 
Source: Edison and Warnock (2001).
Note: This index measures the intensity of restrictions on the access that foreign investors have to a 
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Figure 5. Channels Through Which Financial Integration Can 



































International Financial Integration 
Higher Economic Growth 
Direct Channels 
· · · · Augmentation of domestic savings 
· · · · Lower cost of capital due to better risk 
allocation 
· · · · Transfer of technology 
· · · · Development of financial sector 
 
Indirect Channels 
· · · · Promotion of specialization 
· · · · Inducement for better policies 
· · · · Enhancement of capital inflows by 
signaling better policies 
 
Lower Poverty    
 
37 
Figure 6. Increase in Financial Openness and Growth of Real Per Capita GDP 






































Change in capital account openness, 1982-97 









Note: Capital account openness is measured as (gross private capital inflows + gross private capital 
outflows) / GDP. 
 
Source: Wei and Wu (2002b). 
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Figure 7. Increase in Financial Openness and Growth of Real Per Capita GDP: 
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Note: Capital account openness is measured by the (gross private capital inflows + gross private capital 
outflows) / GDP. 
 
Source: Wei and Wu (2002b). 
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Figure 8. Volatility of Income and Consumption Growth 
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FDI/GDP  Loan/GDP  Portfolio/GDP 
Standard deviations 
(median for each group) 
MFI economies  0.007  0.032  0.009 
LFI economies  0.010  0.036  0.002 
Coefficients of variation 
(median for each group) 
MFI economies  0.696  1.245  1.751 
LFI economies  1.276  1.177  2.494 
Coefficients of variation 
for selected MFI economies 
Indonesia  0.820  0.717  1.722 
Korea  0.591  2.039  1.338 
Malaysia  0.490  4.397  3.544 
Mexico  0.452  2.048  2.088 
Philippines  0.921  0.956  1.979 
Thailand  0.571  0.629  1.137 
Source: Wei (2001). Computed over the period 1980–96. Only countries with at least eight 
non-missing observations during the period for all three variables and with a population 
greater than or equal to one million in 1995 are kept in the sample. Total inward FDI flows, 
total bank loans, and total inward portfolio investments are from the IMF’s Balance of 
Payments Statistics, various issues.    
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Table 2. Fastest and Slowest Growing Economies 
During 1980–2000 and Their Status of Financial Openness 
 
 
  Note: Growth rate of real per capita GDP, in constant local currency units. 

























               
1  China  391.6  Yes/No    Haiti  -39.5  No 
2  Korea  234.0   Yes    Niger  -37.8  No 
3  Singapore  155.5  Yes    Nicaragua  -30.6  No 
4  Thailand  151.1  Yes    Togo  -30.0  No 
5  Mauritius  145.8  No    Cote d’Ivoire  -29.0  No 
6  Botswana  135.4  No    Burundi  -20.2  No 
7  Hong Kong SAR  114.5  Yes    Venezuela  -17.3  Yes/No 
8  Malaysia  108.8  Yes    South Africa  -13.7  Yes 
9  India  103.2  Yes/No    Jordan  -10.9  Yes 
10  Chile  100.9  Yes    Paraguay   -9.5  No 
11  Indonesia   97.6  Yes    Ecuador   -7.9  No 
12  Sri Lanka   90.8  No    Peru   -7.8  Yes 
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Table 3. Summary of Recent Research on Financial Integration and Economic Growth 
 
 
Study  Number of 
Countries 
Years 
Covered  Effect on Growth 
           
Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-Ferretti (1994)  20  1950-89  No effect 
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995)  61  1966-89  No effect 
Quinn (1997)  58  1975-89  Positive 
Kraay (1998)  117  1985-97  No effect / mixed 
Rodrik (1998)  95  1975-89  No effect 
Klein and Olivei (2000)  Up to 92  1986-95  Positive 
Chanda (2001)  116  1976-95  Mixed 
Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2001)  51-59  1973-92  Mixed 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001)  30  1981-97  Positive 
Edwards (2001)  62  1980s  No effect for poor countries 
O' Donnell (2001)  94  1971-94  No effect, or at best mixed 
Reisen and Soto (2001)  44  1986-97  Mixed 
Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2002)  Up to 89  1973-95  Mixed 
Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk (2002)  57  1980-2000  No effect 
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Table 4. Volatility of Annual Growth Rates of Selected Variables 
(Percentage standard deviations, medians for each group of countries) 
Full Sample Decade
1960–99 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
Output (Y)
Industrial countries 2.18 1.91 2.46 2.03 1.61
(0.23) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.14)
MFI economies 3.84 3.31 3.22 4.05 3.59
(0.20) (0.42) (0.37) (0.44) (0.62)
LFI economies 4.67 3.36 4.88 4.53 2.70
(0.35) (0.61) (1.01) (0.69) (0.38)
Income (Q)
Industrial countries 2.73 2.18 2.99 2.54 1.91
(0.34) (0.33) (0.40) (0.29) (0.30)
MFI economies 5.44 3.60 5.43 5.45 4.78
(0.50) (0.47) (0.45) (0.65) (0.72)
LFI economies 7.25 4.42 9.64 7.56 4.59
(0.84) (0.53) (1.24) (1.23) (0.54)
Consumption ( C)
Industrial countries 2.37 1.47 2.16 1.98 1.72
(0.30) (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.20)
MFI economies 5.18 4.57 4.52 4.09 4.66
(0.51) (0.49) (1.04) (0.94) (0.46)
LFI economies 6.61 5.36 7.07 7.25 5.72
(0.78) (0.58) (0.11) (0.81) (0.78)
Total Consumption (C+G)
Industrial countries 1.86 1.38 1.84 1.58 1.38
(0.23) (0.28) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
MFI economies 4.34 3.95 4.19 3.43 4.10
(0.47) (0.51) (0.54) (0.84) (0.53)
LFI economies 6.40 4.85 6.50 6.34 4.79
(0.56) (0.55) (0.93) (0.91) (0.82)
Ratio of Total Consumption (C+G)
to Income (Q)
Industrial countries 0.67 0.75 0.56 0.61 0.58
(0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
MFI economies 0.81 0.92 0.74 0.76 0.92
(0.07) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.04)
LFI economies 0.80 0.95 0.68 0.82 0.84
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.51) (0.14)
 
Notes: From the bottom panel, the ratio of total consumption growth volatility to that of income growth volatility is 
first computed separately for each country. The reported numbers are the within-group medians of those ratios. 
(Note that this is not the same as the ratio of the median of consumption growth volatility to the median of income 
growth volatility.) Standard errors are reported in parentheses.    
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Appendix I. The Effects of Different Types of Capital Flows on Growth 
The cumulative evidence from the literature does not offer a clear-cut and robust support 
for the notion that capital flows generically provides a quantitatively big boost to economic 
growth. However, there have been several studies that suggest that different types of capital 
flows may have different effects. 
Using data for the 1980s, De Mello (1999) reports evidence that FDI flows appear to 
promote economic growth in developing as well as OECD countries. Borenzstein, De Gregorio, 
and Lee (1998) find that the positive effect of FDI can be detected when the recipient countries 
have a sufficiently high level of human capital. 
FDI and other types of capital flows into developing countries started to pick up 
momentum in the 1990s, making it highly desirable to look at the evidence based on more recent 
data. Reisen and Soto (2001) examine six types of capital flows: foreign direct investment, 
portfolio equity flows, portfolio bond flows, long-term bank credits, short term bank credits and 
official flows. They employ a dynamic panel regression framework to deal with potential 
endogeneity and missing variable problems and cover 44 countries over the period 1986–97. Of 
the six types of capital flows, only two, namely FDI and portfolio equity flows, are positively 
associated with subsequent economic growth rates. 
Other studies have looked into the effects of different types of capital flows on domestic 
investment (and hence indirectly on growth). Bosworth and Collins (1999) analyzed such 
relationships using data covering 1979–95, focusing on variations within countries over time 
rather than variations across countries. These authors first removed the country means from the 
data, and then regressed investment and savings shares on various forms of capital inflows 
(relative to GDP). They found that more FDI and bank lending are positively associated with 
increases in domestic investment.  In contrast, the association between portfolio capital inflows 
and domestic investment, while positive, is not statistically significant. These authors made an 
attempt to deal with the possibility that capital flows are endogenous, meaning that capital flows 
and domestic investment can both be determined simultaneously by a common third factor. 
 
The World Bank' s report on Global Development Finance (2001) replicated the 
Bosworth-Collins study using a data set with more countries and a longer time period (1972–98). 
It found that the association between FDI (or other long term capital inflows or bank lending) 
and domestic investment is stronger than between short-term debt and domestic investment. The 
association between portfolio capital and domestic investment is not statistically significant. 
To summarize, across different recent studies surveyed here, FDI is one form of capital 
inflows that tends to be found positively associated with domestic investment and domestic 
growth in a relatively consistent manner. Other forms of capital inflows could also have a 
positive relationship, but their effects tend to be less robust or less strong.    
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Appendix II. Do Financial and Trade Integration Have Different Effects on Economic 
Development? Evidence from Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality 
As an alternative to examining the effect of openness on economic growth, this appendix 
asks: Do trade and financial openness help to raise life expectancy and reduce infant mortality in 
developing countries? Are their effects different? 
 
There are three motivations for studying these questions (see Wei and Wu (2002b)). First, 
as life expectancy and infant mortality are important dimensions of a society’s well-being, they 
are interesting objects to look at in their own right. Second, data on income level or growth come 
from national accounts. So all studies on economic growth have to make use of variations of the 
similar data sources. In comparison, vital statistics come from an entirely different data source 
(i.e., birth and death records) and are typically collected by different government agencies. 
Therefore, they offer an independent and complementary check on the effect of openness on the 
livelihood of people. Third, to compare income levels or growth rates across countries, it is 
necessary to make certain purchasing power parity (PPP) adjustments to nominal income. 
However, existing PPP adjustments may not be reliable (Deaton (2001)). In contrast, the 
definitions of life and death are consistent across countries, so there is a higher degree of 
comparability than the data on poverty, income or income distribution. 
 
  Data on 79 developing countries over the period 1962–97 are examined. This data set 
covers all developing countries for which the relevant data exist and for which changes in infant 
mortality and life expectancy are not dominated by large-scale wars, genocides, famines, or 
major outbursts of AIDS epidemics. Panel regressions with country fixed effects as well as 
dynamic panel regressions are employed to account for other factors that may affect health and 
to account for possible endogeneity of the openness variables. 
The results, summarized in Figure II.1, suggest that the effects of trade and financial 
openness are different. There is no positive and robust association across developing countries 
between faster increase in financial integration and faster improvement in a society’s health. By 
comparison, there are several pieces of evidence suggesting that higher trade integration is 
associated with a faster increase in life expectancy and a faster reduction in infant mortality. For 
example, an 11 percentage point reduction in the average statutory tariff rate—approximately 
equal to one standard deviation of the change in the statutory tariff rate over the 1962–97 
period—is associated with between 3 to 6 less infants dying per thousand live births, even after 
controlling for the effects of changes in per capita income, average female education and other 




Figure II.1. Differential Effects of Financial and Trade Integration 
on Improvements in Health 
 
A lower trade barrier is associated with a longer life expectancy, but higher financial integration is not. 
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A lower trade barrier is associated with lower infant mortality, but a rise in financial integration is not. 
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Note: conditional on income per capita, years of      Note: conditional on tariff rate, income per capita,  
schooling, physicians per 1000 people, democracy,     years of schooling, physicians per 1000 people,  
and country fixed effects.           democracy, and country fixed effects. 
 
Notes: On the vertical axises in the figures in the first row is log life expectancy at birth (in years). On the vertical 
axises in the figures in the second row is infant mortality, defined as the number of infants who die before reaching 
the first birthday per 1000 live births. Tariff rate refers to average statutory tariff rate. Financial integration is 
measured by (gross private capital inflows + gross private capital outflows) / GDP. 
Source: These calculations are based on Wei and Wu (2002b).    
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Appendix III. The Effects of Globalization on Volatility: A Review of the Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Unlike the rich empirical literature focusing on the impact of financial openness on 
economic growth, there are only a limited number of studies analyzing the links between 
openness and macroeconomic volatility. Moreover, existing studies have generally been unable 
to document a clear empirical link between openness and macroeconomic volatility. Razin and 
Rose (1994) study the impact of trade and financial openness on the volatility of output, 
consumption, and investment for a sample of 138 countries over the period 1950–88. They find 
no significant empirical link between openness and the volatility of these variables. 
 
Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001) explore the sources of output volatility using data for 
a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960–97. They find that a higher level of development 
of the domestic financial sector is associated with lower volatility. On the other hand, an increase 
in the degree of trade openness leads to an increase in the volatility of output, especially in 
developing countries. Their results indicate that neither financial openness nor the volatility of 
capital flows has a significant impact on output volatility.  
 
Buch, Dopke, and Pierdzioch (2002) use data for 25 OECD countries to examine the link 
between financial openness and output volatility. They report that there is no consistent empirical 
relationship between financial openness and the volatility of output. Gavin and Hausmann (1996) 
study the sources of output volatility in developing countries over the period 1970–92. They find 
that there is a significant positive association between the volatility of capital flows and output 
volatility. O’Donnell (2001) examines the effect of financial integration on the volatility of 
output growth over the period 1971–94 using data for 93 countries. He finds that a higher degree 
of financial integration is associated with lower (higher) output volatility in OECD (non-OECD) 
countries. His results also suggest that countries with more developed financial sectors are able 
to reduce output volatility through financial integration.  
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2002) examine the impact of equity market liberalization 
on the volatility of output and consumption during 1980–2000. They find that, following equity 
market liberalizations, there is a significant decline in both output and consumption volatility. 
Capital account openness reduces the volatility of output and consumption, but its impact is 
smaller than that of equity market liberalization. However, they also report that capital account 
openness increases the volatility of output and consumption in emerging market countries. The 
September 2002 WEO provides some evidence indicating that financial openness is associated 
with lower output volatility in developing countries. 
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Appendix IV. Calculating the Potential Welfare Gains from International Risk Sharing 
International financial integration could result in potentially large welfare gains 
as it allows domestic residents, firms, and countries to smooth fluctuations in their 
consumption/revenue by diversifying away country-specific risks. For example, during 
recessions, countries can borrow from international markets and mitigate the adverse impact of 
declines in aggregate output on consumption and investment. During expansions, they can lend 
to other countries and/or pay back the loans they borrow during the recessions. Domestic 
residents and firms can also utilize international financial markets for consumption smoothing 
and receive large welfare benefits as these markets significantly expand the set of available 
financial instruments for international risk sharing purposes. Firms can invest in plants abroad to 
protect themselves against shocks associated with domestic cost or productivity changes. 
Developing countries, in particular, can obtain large welfare gains through international 
risk sharing considering the highly volatile nature of income and consumption dynamics in these 
countries. Generally speaking, the scope for benefiting from international risk sharing tends to be 
large when a country’s consumption growth is volatile, positively correlated with domestic 
output growth, and not highly correlated with world consumption. Recent empirical studies 
suggest that these features tend to characterize most developing countries. This is particularly the 
case, on average for LFI economies, somewhat less so for MFI economies, and still less so for 
advanced countries. 
The potential welfare gains from international risk sharing and the consequent reduction 
in the volatility of consumption can be calculated using a simple model (see below for details).
51 
In brief, the model compares two scenarios. The first one has no additional risk sharing (relative 
to what is already implied by observed consumption behavior) while, in the second one, there is 
perfect risk-sharing so that each country consumes a (constant) fraction of total world 
consumption. Since total world consumption tends to be less volatile than the consumption of 
individual countries, the second scenario results in smoother national consumption patterns. The 
model can be used to generate quantitative estimates of the consumption-equivalent increase in 
welfare resulting from such reductions in consumption volatility.  
Figure IV.1 reports the median gains (in terms of per capita consumption) for each group 
of economies. The gains are generally inversely proportional to the current degree of financial 
integration with the world economy. Highly volatile consumption fluctuations faced by 
LFI economies implies that the benefits to financial integration and consequent reductions in 
consumption volatility would be very large for these economies. On average, these benefits 
would have the same effect as about a 6 percent permanent increase in the level  
                                                 
51The calculations closely follow the methodology employed in van Wincoop (1994, 1999).    
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Note: Welfare gains measured in percent of consumption. 
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of per capita consumption.
52 Even for MFI economies, the potential gains from further 
international risk-sharing are quite large. 
Methodology 
This subsection briefly explains the methodology underlying the welfare gain 
calculations summarized above. During the past decade, a growing body of literature has 
examined the welfare implications of international risk sharing. While some studies focus on the 
welfare gains based upon consumption series, some others examine the gains from risk sharing 
using stock returns data in this literature. In these studies, a consumer/investor is able to increase 
her current welfare because she is able to reduce the volatility of her marginal utility of 
consumption/wealth over her life time by pooling country specific risk associated with the 
fluctuations in her consumption/wealth. 
Most studies in this literature employ dynamic representative agent models and consider 
a variety of stochastic processes for consumption series.
53 The standard approach in these studies 
involves determining consumption allocations under two environments. Under the first 
environment, there is no risk sharing and domestic consumption is equal to domestic output. 
Under the second environment, there is often perfect consumption risk sharing as countries are 
able to diversify away all country specific risk associated with fluctuations in domestic 
consumption.
54 Moving from the first environment to the second one, the volatility of 
consumption in each country could go down, the pricing of the consumption streams of countries 
might change, and the cross-country correlations of consumption series could increase. The 
resulting welfare gains are associated with reductions in the volatility of consumption and/or 
changes in the pricing of the consumption series. The welfare gain calculations generate a 
welfare estimate which is equal to the permanent relative increase in the expected level of 
consumption that would lead to the same welfare under international risk sharing.  
As with several earlier studies, standard practice is followed here and consumption 
allocations under two environments are computed using a simple representative agent model 
economy. In particular, the welfare gain calculations here closely follow the methodology 
employed in van Wincoop (1994, 1999). In the model economy, there are N countries which can 
trade in claims on their endowment streams when there is perfect consumption risk sharing. 
Residents in each country have the same preferences and expected utility is equal to 
                                                 
52While the actual welfare estimates depend on the parameterization of the model, the general flavor of 
these results is unaffected by the choice of parameter values. 
53While the literature based upon consumption/output series employs general equilibrium models with 
utility depends on the level of consumption, the literature based upon equity returns generally uses partial 
equilibrium models with utility directly depends upon wealth. The approach using equity returns data 
involves devising an optimum portfolio composed of domestic and foreign stocks that minimize variance 
and maximize returns. 
54Some studies also consider the welfare implications of imperfect risk sharing arrangements involving 




















where H is the horizon (number of years), g denotes the rate of relative risk aversion,  it c  is 
aggregate consumption by residents of country i.
55  it y  represents the endowment and follows a 
random walk with drift: 
i it it it d y dt y dy h s m + =  
where  i h  is a standard Brownian motion.  k id d h h r =   ) ( k i ¹  represents the correlation 
between the innovations of endowment growth across two different countries.  
In the first environment, there is no additional risk sharing relative to what is already 
implied by observed consumption behavior and domestic consumption is equal to domestic 
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In the second environment, there is perfect consumption risk sharing as countries are able 
to diversify away all country specific risk associated with domestic consumption. This implies 
that consumption in each country is equal to the per capita world endowment, which is denoted 
by 
W y . Aggregate consumption of a representative country in this case follows approximately a 
random walk process with variance  ) ) / 1 1 ( ) / 1 ((
2 2 r s s N N W - + =  (see Lewis (2000)). The 
measure of the welfare gain is the permanent percentage increase in the expected level of 
consumption which produces an equivalent improvement in welfare. The approximate welfare 
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55It is assumed that all consumption goods are tradable. It is possible to consider a utility formulation with 
separable tradable and non-tradable consumption goods. However, sharing of risk associated with the 
fluctuations in non-tradables consumption is not possible and our dataset does not allow us to make a 




2 5 . 0 gs m m - =  denotes the risk adjusted growth rate,  m g b + = r represents the risk free 
interest rate, and 
2 2 2 s s s - = W d  is the change in the variance of consumption growth. 
The main parameters of the model are also taken from van Wincoop (1999). In particular, 
the risk-free real interest rate is assumed to be 0.85 percent and the coefficient of relative risk-
aversion is set at 3.
56 For each country, the mean growth rate and variance of per capita domestic 
consumption, and the correlation between the per capita domestic consumption growth and the 
world consumption growth are estimated and these values are used in the calculations. Since the 
dataset employed covers the 1970–97 period, these gains correspond to a horizon of 28 years. A 
decrease in the risk free rate translates into larger welfare gains while a decrease in the risk 
aversion coefficient is associated with smaller gains. The welfare gains get smaller with the 
correlation between domestic consumption and the world consumption while they tend to 
increase in the volatility of consumption series. 
The welfare gains reported in the main text of this paper are consistent with the estimates 
found in some recent studies. While some of these studies report relatively small gains, a 
majority of them finds that gains from risk sharing are quite large, especially for developing 
countries as Table IV.1 displays. van Wincoop (1994) provides a detailed explanation of why 
various studies report different results. There are four major parameters affecting the magnitude 
of welfare gains in these studies: (1) the volatility of domestic output; (2) the rate of relative risk 
aversion; (3) the risk-adjusted growth rate, and (4) the risk free interest rate. It is easy to 
understand why some of the studies produce relatively low welfare gains: In some studies (Cole 
and Obstfeld (1991) and Obstfeld (1994a)) the risk-free rate is quite high. Some studies assume 
certain stationary processes for consumption or shock series, which generate low welfare gains 
because of the low persistence or volatility associated with these processes (Tesar (1995) and 
Mendoza (1995)).  
Some studies use the data of advanced countries and find large welfare gains through 
international risk sharing.
57 For example, van Wincoop (1999) finds that for the OECD countries 
the potential welfare gains from international risk sharing are between 1.1 percent to 3.5 percent. 
Several recent studies consider the implications of international risk sharing for developing 
                                                 
56Since these approximate calculations ignore the pricing problem of international claims, they do not 
include the welfare changes associated with the pricing of countries’ endowment streams. In countries 
with highly volatile consumption fluctuations, the welfare losses from price changes can be quite large. 
However, as the volatility of consumption increases, the welfare gain from risk sharing rapidly rises and 
outweighs the losses due to the pricing of consumption streams. van Wincoop (1994) provides an 
extensive discussion of the gains associated with these price changes using the data of the OECD 
countries. 
57Calculations of the gains from international risk sharing based upon stock returns produce much larger 
welfare gains estimates than those based upon international consumption data do. Lewis (1999) examines 
this issue and finds that the major differences are due to the much higher volatility of stock returns and 
the implied intertemporal substitution in marginal utility. Lewis (1999) reports that the gains to 
international risk sharing based upon stock based upon stock returns are quite large, around 10 to 50 
percent. Le Baron (2002) claims that these gains got smaller during the past 15 years.    
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countries. Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) calculate the estimates of the degree of 
uncertainty associated with the growth potential of an economy at various horizons. They find 
that the welfare gain from sharing of risk associated with the growth uncertainty is around 6.5 
percent using the data of 49 developed and developing countries. Obstfeld (1995) finds that 
elimination of consumption variability through risk sharing can result in much larger welfare 
gains in developing countries and reports that these gains are between 0.54 percent and 5.31 
percent for a selected group of developing economies. Pallage and Robe (2002) find that the 
welfare gains associated with smoothing consumption fluctuations are much larger in African 
countries than those in the United States, and depending on the parameterization of the model 
economy these gains can easily exceed 10 percent for several African countries. 
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Table IV.1. Summary of Studies on Welfare Gains 
from International Risk Sharing 
 
 
Study \ Countries Studied  Welfare Gains 
 Advanced Countries  
  
  
Lucas (1987)  Small 
Cole and Obstfeld (1991)   Small 
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992)  Small 
Mendoza (1995)  Small 
Tesar (1995)  Small 
Kim, Kim, and Levine (2002)  Small 
Obstfeld (1994a)  Large 
van Wincoop (1994, 1996, 1999))  Large  
Pallage and Robe (2002b)  Large 
Epaulard and Pommeret (2001)  Large 
Lewis (1996)  Large 
Shiller and Athanasoulis (2001)   Large 
Auffret (2001)  Large 
Kim and Kim (2002)  Large 
     
Advanced, MFI and LFI Countries    
Obstfeld (1994b, 1995)  Large 
Pallage and Robe (2002a)  Large 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1999)  Large 
De Ferranti et. al. (2000)   Large 
Athanasoulis and Shiller (1995)   Large 
   
Notes: "Small" refers to the studies which report welfare gains less than 0.5% 




Unless indicated otherwise, the primary sources for the data used in this paper are the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The 
basic data sample comprises 76 countries—21 industrial and 55 developing.
58 
Industrial countries 
Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland 
(FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), 
Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Sweden 
(SWE), Switzerland (CHE), United Kingdom (GBR), and United States (USA). 
Developing countries 
These are grouped into More Financially Integrated (22) and Less Financially Integrated (33) 
countries. 
MFIs 
Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), China (CHN), Colombia (COL), Egypt (EGY), 
Hong Kong (HKG), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Israel (ISR), Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), 
Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MAR), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), Philippines (PHL), Singapore 
(SGP), South Africa (ZAF), Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), and Venezuela (VEN). 
LFIs 
Algeria (DZA), Bangladesh (BGD), Benin (GEN), Bolivia (BOL), Botswana (BWA), Burkina 
Faso (BFA), Burundi (BDI), Cameron (CMR), Costa Rica (CRI), Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), 
Dominican Republic (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), El Salvador (SLV), Gabon (GAB), Ghana (GHA), 
Guatemala (GTM), Haiti (HTI), Honduras (HND), Jamaica (JAM), Kenya (KEN), Mauritius 
(MUS), Nicaragua (NIC), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGA), Panama (PAN), Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), Paraguay (PRY), Senegal (SEN), Sri Lanka (LKA), Syrian Arab Republic (SYR), Togo 
(TGO), Tunisia (TUN), and Uruguay (URY). 
                                                 
58 The following were excluded from the analysis: small countries (those with population below 1 
million), transition economies, some oil producers, and other countries with incomplete or clearly 
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